By Tim Dickinson 
March 8, 2007 
A panel of experts convened by Rolling Stone agree that the war in Iraq is 
lost. The only question now is: How bad will the coming explosion be? 
The war in Iraq isn’t over yet, but — surge or no surge — the United 
States has already lost. That’s the grim consensus of a panel of experts 
assembled by Rolling Stone to assess the future of Iraq. “Even if we had a 
million men to go in, it’s too late now,” says retired four-star Gen. Tony 
McPeak, who served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War. “Humpty 
Dumpty can’t be put back together again.” 
Those on the panel — including diplomats, counterterror analysts and a 
former top military commander — agree that President Bush’s attempt to 
secure Baghdad will only succeed in dragging out the conflict, creating 
something far beyond any Vietnam-style “quagmire.” The surge won’t bring an 
end to the sectarian cleansing that has ravaged Iraq, as the newly empowered 
Shiite majority seeks to settle scores built up during centuries of 
oppressive rule by the Sunni minority. It will do nothing to defuse the 
powder keg that an independence-minded Kurdistan, in Iraq’s northern 
provinces, poses to the governments of Turkey, Syria and Iran, which have 
long brutalized their own Kurdish separatists. And it will only worsen the 
global war on terror. 
“Our invasion and occupation has created a cauldron that will continue to 
draw in the players in the Middle East for the foreseeable future,” says 
Michael Scheuer, who led the CIA’s hunt for Osama bin Laden. “By taking out 
Saddam, we have allowed the jihad to move 1,000 kilometers west, where it 
can project its power, its organizers, its theology into Turkey — and from 
Turkey into Europe.” 
How bad will things get in Iraq — and what price will the world ultimately 
pay for the president’s decision to prolong the war? To answer those 
questions, we asked our panel to sketch out three distinct scenarios for 
Iraq: the best we can hope for, the most likely outcome and the worst that 
could happen. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski 
National security adviser to President Carter 
Richard Clarke 
Counterterrorism czar from 1992 to 2003 
Nir Rosen 
Author of In the Belly of the Green Bird, about Iraq¹s spiral into civil 
war, speaking from Cairo, where he has been interviewing Iraqi refugees 
Gen. Tony McPeak (retired) 
Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War 
Bob Graham 
Former chair, Senate Intelligence Committee 
Chas Freeman 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War; president of the Middle East 
Policy Council 
Paul Pillar 
Former lead counterterrorism analyst for the CIA 
Michael Scheuer 
Former chief of the CIA¹s Osama bin Laden unit; author of Imperial Hubris 
Juan Cole 
Professor of modern Middle East history at the University of Michigan 
Zbigniew Brzezinski: If we are willing to engage with all of Iraq’s 
neighbors — including Iran — in a regional effort to contain the violence, 
the best we can hope for is an Iraq that is politically passive but hostile 
toward America. 
Gen. Tony McPeak: It’s not a question of whether we’re going to leave Iraq 
— it’s a question of when. And everybody in Iraq knows that. So they say, 
“Fine. We’ll stock arms and wait for you guys to leave. And then we’ll do 
what we want.” 
But the administration has repeatedly highlighted the potential for chaos in 
Iraq after our departure as a reason we must stay and fight. 
Richard Clarke: All the things they say will happen are already happening. 
Iraq is already a base for terrorists; there is already a civil war. We’ve 
got 150,000 troops there now and we can’t stop it. 
Nir Rosen: There is no best-case scenario for Iraq. It’s complete anarchy 
now. No family is untouched by kidnappings, murders, ethnic cleansing — 
everybody lives in a constant state of terror. Leaving aside Kurdistan, 
which is very different, there’s nobody in Iraq who is safe. You can get 
killed for being a Sunni, for being a Shia, for being educated, for being 
part of the former regime, for being part of the current regime. The 
Americans are still killing Iraqi civilians left and right. There’s no 
government in Iraq; it doesn’t exist outside of the Green Zone. That’s not 
only the government’s fault, that’s our fault: We deliberately created a 
weak government so that we would have final authority over everything in 
Michael Scheuer: Even in the best-case scenario, the disaster we’re seeing 
now is nothing compared to the disaster that we’ll see after we leave. The 
real issue here is American interest: The longer we stay, the more people we 
get killed. I don’t think the longer we stay, the better we make Iraq. 
Probably the reverse. 
What happens to the civil war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia Arabs when we 
Juan Cole: The civil war will go on for five or ten years — that’s 
inevitable. But the best-case scenario is, at the end of it they find a way 
to come back together as a nation-state, like Lebanon did in 1989. 
Rosen: People are talking about a reconciliation process, but Iraqi Shias 
don’t want to compromise with the Sunnis. They don’t have to. There’s going 
to be a genocide of Sunnis in Baghdad. The Shia have the numbers to do it; 
they can absorb all the Sunni car bombs it takes. The Americans aren’t 
capable of stopping it; they can’t tell a Sunni from a Shia. The best you 
can hope for is that it doesn’t spill into the neighboring countries. 
McPeak: You have to hope that Iraq devolves into a federal state with three 
strong regional governments. But that has its downsides: The Turks would go 
berserk. They would see Kurdistan as a base for the Kurdish insurgency 
inside Turkey, which has bedeviled them like the IRA in Ireland or the 
Basques in Spain. And if Iraq devolves into three separate “stans,” then 
it’s going to be pretty tough for Sunnistan not to provide a retirement home 
for Al Qaeda agents. It’s got warts all over it — but among t
he “don’t call 
my baby ugly” possibilities in this world, that looks the prettiest. 
So even in the best of scenarios, Al Qaeda has a lasting base in Iraq? 
Paul Pillar: The president made it sound like Osama bin Laden is poised to 
march into Baghdad and take up residence in one of Saddam’s old palaces and 
rule this terrorist state. Nothing of the sort is possible — even as a 
worst-case scenario. It is true that five years from now, the same people 
honing their skills in Anbar province may form the cell that will try to 
pull off another 9/11. But that’s going to happen regardless of what we do. 
We have the best chance of minimizing those sorts of costs by getting out. 
At least that takes away the anti-American cause célèbre effect of our 
presence there. 
Scheuer: No matter what happens now, the Islamists will have beaten both of 
the superpowers — first the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and now the United 
States in the heart of Islam. The impact of that in Islamic civilization is 
going to be enormous. We have made bin Laden a prophet: His organizing 
concept for Al Qaeda was “The Russians are a lot tougher than the Americans. 
If we can beat the Russians, then we can eventually beat the Americans.” 
Even more important, Al Qaeda will have contiguous territory on the Arab 
peninsula to attack from. 
Where does that leave Israel? 
Scheuer: The neoconservatives and their war in Iraq have made Israeli 
security worse than at any time since 1967. You’ll see more and more people 
trying to launch attacks in Israel who are not Palestinian or Lebanese. None 
of it bodes well for a Middle East peace settlement. 
McPeak: We’re going to see a full-scale intercommunal war that may not burn 
out until one side is all dead, all gone. The Kurds would like to sit on the 
sidelines, but I don’t see how they stay out, especially up in the Kirkuk 
area, where they sit on a lot of oil. This is going to be ethnic cleansing 
like we had in Kosovo or Bosnia — but written big, in capital letters. And 
we can’t stop it. 
Bob Graham: If you’re looking for an analogy, it’s going to be a heightened 
version of the civil war that ravaged Lebanon for fifteen years. 
Scheuer: There isn’t any upper limit to how many people could get killed. 
Depending on how long the war lasts — a million casualties? 
So what kind of government is Iraq most likely to be left with when all is 
said and done? 
McPeak: A Shia dictatorship headed by some lieutenant colonel who we don’t 
even know yet. It’s a restoration of Saddam Hussein, except now he’s Shia, 
and maybe he’s in religious robes rather than a uniform. 
So forget about democracy? 
Pillar: Stability and lowering the bloodshed is the range of outcomes and 
expectations we ought to be talking about now, not looking for Switzerland 
on the Tigris or anything remotely resembling a liberal democracy. A Shia 
Saddam — without nearly as much brutality, but still a strongman — is 
actually one of the best hopes. 
Chas Freeman: The most efficient way to avoid mass killings is to help the 
Shiites win fast, consolidate their damn dictatorship and get the hell out. 
The level of anarchy and hatred and emotional disturbance is such that it’s 
very hard to imagine anything except a Saddam-style reign of terror 
succeeding in pacifying the place. 
Where does that leave us with regard to Iran? 
McPeak: Iran’s influence will have been increased geometrically. We’re 
already the losers in this, and now we become the big-time losers. 
Freeman: The net effect of our policies has been to make the area safe for 
Iran, which I guess is why we’re now threatening attacks on Iran. 
Rosen: Our Sunni allies in the region, the so-called moderate states — 
dictatorships like Jordan and Saudi Arabia — are pushing the U.S. to switch 
sides and support the Sunnis. We’ve been working up to that, obviously. The 
whole buildup to a new war against Iran, which sounds so much like the 
buildup in 2002, is part of that. You no longer hear about Al Qaeda in Iraq. 
More and more we’re hearing about Iran and Shias. 
Graham: This administration seems to be getting ready to make — at a much 
more significant, escalated level — the same mistake we made in Iran that 
we made in Iraq. If Iraq has been a disaster, this would be multiple times 
Iraq. The extent to which this could be the horror of the twenty-first 
century is hard to exaggerate. 
Brzezinski: If the war continues without any American willingness to 
accommodate regionally and to pull out, the Iraq War will be extended to 
Iran. And if we get involved in a war with Iran, that raises the prospect of 
a twenty-year-long involvement in protracted violence in Iraq, Iran, 
Afghanistan and probably Pakistan. I’m not a prophet, but if the president 
doesn’t change course, then the more grim prognosis is a likely one. 
Freeman: This could become the Islamic equivalent of the Thirty Years War 
between Protestants and Catholics in Europe in the 1600s — a religious 
schism that blossoms into overt mayhem and murder and massacres and warfare. 
The various Iraqi factions will obtain the backing of other Middle Eastern 
states as they conduct their ideological and ethnic struggles. It will be a 
free-for-all that spreads beyond the anarchic zone of Iraq. 
Scheuer: The Shiites in Iran will not tolerate the re-emergence of a Sunni 
government in Iraq. And the last thing the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Egyptians, 
Jordanians and the rest of the Sunni-dominated states will tolerate is 
letting the Shia control another oil-rich state in the Muslim heartland. So 
you’re going to see those states running guns and money to Sunni fighters in 
Iraq. For Jordan and Egypt, this is a golden opportunity to send their young 
firebrands to fight in Iraq as they did in Afghanistan. It’s kind of a 
pressure-release valve for Sunni dictatorships: People who would be out 
causing problems because their governments aren’t Islamic enough will be out 
in Iraq fighting the ultimate heretics, the Shia. 
So this could explode into a wider regional conflict? 
Clarke: I find it difficult to walk through the scenario which creates the 
wider regional war. The Saudi, Jordanian and Syrian leaders are all 
rational. The Iranians, despite what we may think of them, are very rational 
actors, from their perspective. So the idea that any of these nations is 
going to want to have a multination war is hard to understand. These 
scenarios the administration talks about for wider regional war remind me of 
the “domino effect” in Vietnam. We were always told while in Vietnam that if 
we pulled out, it would result in the fall of Indonesia, the fall of 
Malaysia, th
e fall of Thailand, the fall of the Philippines. And, of course, 
it didn’t. 
Graham: I disagree. I believe the chance that the chaos in Iraq could bring 
countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia into the mix is in the forty to fifty 
percent range. The big danger is what I call the August 1914 Syndrome. The 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo — what would have been in 
the scale of history a minor event — set in motion activities that turned 
out to be beyond the ability of the Western powers to control. And they 
ended up in one of the most brutal wars in man’s history by accident. If the 
Saudis come in heavily on the side of the Sunnis, as they have threatened to 
do, and the Iranians — directly or through shadow groups like Hezbollah — 
become active on behalf of the Shiites, and the Turks and the Kurds get into 
a border conflict, the flames could spread throughout the region. The real 
nightmare beyond the nightmare is if the large Islamic populations in 
Western Europe become inflamed. Then it could be a global situation. 
Rosen: Iraq will be the battleground where the Sunni-Shia conflict will be 
fought, but it won’t be limited to Iraq. It will spread. Pandora’s box is 
open. We didn’t just open it, we opened it and threw fuel into it and threw 
matches into it. You’ll soon see Sunni militias destabilizing countries like 
Jordan and Syria — where the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood is very strong. It 
took about ten years for the Palestinians to become politicized and 
militarized when they were first expelled from Palestine. You’re likely to 
see something like that occurring in the huge Iraqi refugee populations in 
Syria and Jordan. King Abdullah of Jordan is resented for being an American 
stooge and an accomplice with Israel. I’m convinced that the monarchy in 
Jordan will fall as a result of this, and Israel will be confronted with a 
frontline state on its longest border with an Arab country. 
Scheuer: I can’t help but think we’ve signed Jordan’s death warrant. The 
country is already on a simmering boil because of the king’s oppression of 
Islamists. It could turn into a police state like Egypt, or an incoherent, 
revolving-door-type government like Lebanon is becoming now. 
Rosen: You’re going to see borders changing, governments falling. Lebanon is 
already on the precipice. Throughout the region, government officials are 
terrified. Nobody knows how to stop it. This is World War III. How far will 
it spread? Anywhere there are Islamic movements, like in Somalia, in Sudan, 
in Yemen. Pakistan has always had Sunni-Shia fighting. The flow of Iraqi 
refugees will at some point affect Europe. 
McPeak: The worst case? Iraq’s Sunnis begin to be backed into a corner, then 
the Sunni governments — Jordan, Saudi Arabia — jump in. Israel sees that 
it’s threatened by these developments. Once the Israelis get involved, then 
everybody piles on. And you’ve got nuclear events going off in the Middle 
East. That would be about as bad as it could get. 
Not to be crass, but what does that kind of conflict do to the global oil 
Cole: During the war between Iraq and Iran, Saddam and Khomeini didn’t 
destroy each other’s oil-producing capabilities, because they knew it would 
make each of them a Fourth World country. But if you get a big multicountry 
guerrilla war, guerrillas could do what they’ve been doing in northern Iraq: 
Hit the oil pipelines. Guerrillas aren’t calculating it the way states are 
as far as mutually assured destruction. If you got pipeline sabotage in Iran 
and Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq, you could take twelve percent of the 
world’s petroleum production off the market. That looks like the second 
Great Depression. 
McPeak: This is a dark chapter in our history. Whatever else happens, our 
country’s international standing has been frittered away by people who don’t 
have the foggiest understanding of how the hell the world works. America has 
been conducting an experiment for the past six years, trying to validate the 
proposition that it really doesn’t make any difference who you elect 
president. Now we know the result of that experiment [laughs]. If a guy is 
stupid, it makes a big difference. 

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